Impressive Financial Report but Decreasing Stock Price: Is Leading Stablecoin Project CRCL Still a Good Buy?

By: blockbeats|2025/12/10 14:00:03
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Original Article Title: "Bull vs Bear Debate: Is Leading Stablecoin CRCL Worth Buying? Why Didn't Strong Growth Financial Report Move the Stock Price?"
Original Article Author: Ding Dang, Odaily Planet Daily

Recently, the X Chinese community has sparked a heated discussion around "Circle (NYSE: CRCL) Worth Buying," with public opinion clearly divided into two major camps. One side sees it as a valuable target in the stablecoin race with significant institutional advantages, while the other side has repeatedly questioned the fragility of its profit model and potential cyclical risks. The clash of viewpoints reflects the drastically different judgment logic and expectation levels of the current market towards innovative projects.

Based on a large amount of public discussion and rational analysis within the community, Odaily Planet Daily has sorted out the core arguments and reasoning paths of both sides, attempting to present to readers the deeper structural disagreements behind the controversy beyond emotion and stance.

Background Overview

Since its listing on the NYSE on June 5, 2025, Circle (NYSE: CRCL) has undergone a complete cycle of a typical "narrative-driven asset" price curve: starting from an issuance price of $64, it quickly surged to a peak of $298.9, then gradually retraced, and around November 20, 2025, returned to near the issuance price, hitting a low of $64.9 and recently rebounding to around $83.9.

On November 12, 2025, CRCL released its first full quarter (Q3) financial report post-IPO: total revenue of $7.4 billion, a 66% year-on-year increase; net profit of $2.14 billion, EPS of $0.64, significantly exceeding market expectations. The key drivers were the USDC circulation soaring from $35.5 billion in the same period last year to $73.7 billion (+108%), and the rise in reserve asset yield in a high-interest-rate environment.

However, the stock price dropped 11.4% on the first day after the financial report was released, with a total weekly decline of 20%. Key pain points included high distribution costs ($448 million, accounting for 60% of revenue), operating expenses eroding profits, a high proportion of non-recurring revenue (71% from investment fair value changes), and the selling pressure caused by the unlocking of restricted shares. According to SEC filings, the IPO lock-up period ended after the Q3 financial report, and a significant number of potentially unlocked shares started on November 14.

Amidst these facts and the differing views, Odaily Planet Daily has compiled the opinions of individuals such as @0xNing0x, Jiang Zhuo'er, @Phyrex_Ni, @BTCdayu, @qinbafrank, facilitating readers in comparative analysis.

1. Sustainability of the Revenue Model: Is CRCL a Bank or Financial Infrastructure?

Jiang Zhuo'er believes that CRCL's profit primarily comes from "earning the spread": users convert money into USDC, Circle allocates these funds to low-risk assets such as U.S. Treasury bonds, earns interest income, and then deducts operating costs and distribution fees.

However, the problem lies in the fact that CRCL's profit distribution structure is extremely unfavorable to itself. According to the agreement, about 61% of the profit is to be shared with Coinbase, and Coinbase also holds a 22% share of USDC, which receives 100% of the earnings from this portion. In other words, the proportion of profit that CRCL can actually retain is very low.

More importantly, during a low-interest-rate period, the vulnerability of this "earning the spread" model will be greatly magnified. When the U.S. bond interest rate falls to around 2% in the long term and operating costs approach 1%, after deducting distribution fees, CRCL may even enter a loss-making state.

He believes that CRCL's current profit structure is not derived from business efficiency but rather from a regulatory arrangement that prohibits the issuer from directly paying national bond interest to users. This model is essentially a parasitic structure, and once policies are relaxed, or competitors circumvent restrictions indirectly through rewards, rebates, staking, and other means, CRCL's profit margin will be directly eroded.

@0xNing0x then further dissects CRCL's profit structure. CRCL's net profit is highly correlated with three core variables—USDC issuance scale, the Federal Reserve benchmark rate, and distribution channel costs.

Retrospectively analyzing historical financial data, these three variables do not have the same elasticity coefficient in relation to profit: the scale factor has an elasticity of about 2.1, the interest rate factor about 1.9, and the channel cost about 1.3. This means that changes in the USDC scale have the greatest impact on profit. According to calculations, for every $100 billion increase in USDC scale, there is theoretically an additional profit of about $1.14 billion, corresponding to approximately 21% of profit elasticity amplification.

Both of them believe that CRCL is akin to a tech-clad bank, but the market has priced it based on a valuation logic of tech stocks or even a "tech + bank" hybrid, which is a clear mismatch, and the stock price will sooner or later return to reality.

In contrast, BTCdayu and qinbafrank have a different understanding. They do not agree with the analogy that "CRCL is a bank." They believe that simplifying CRCL as a bank that earns the spread is a very surface-level observation.

In their view, what CRCL is doing is a typical "lose money first, then dominate" business. The profit sharing is not mandatory but a strategic choice. The essence is not to make a short-term profit, but to exchange for irreversible accumulation of scale, network effects, and user mindshare.

They draw parallels to companies like Amazon, Pinduoduo, JD, and others: these companies have all experienced years of losses, even being considered to have flawed business models, but later proved that these losses were the cost of "buying the market" rather than a structural defect. If you measure these companies by current profits, you can only conclude that they "should have closed down long ago."

In their view, the stablecoin market is a highly likely "winner-takes-all" race. Once USDC establishes an irreversible advantage in compliance and scale, today's seemingly heavy revenue sharing costs will be transformed into pricing power in the future. At that time, the state of "begging others to use" will turn into "others begging for access."

2. Will the rate cut cycle pierce the profit model?

Jiang Zhuo'er and some cautious people are very clear: interest rates are CRCL's lifeline.

As Circle's revenue highly depends on the U.S. bond yield, as long as the interest rate trend is downward, CRCL's revenue ceiling will be systematically compressed. Even if USDC's scale grows, in their view, it is challenging to fully offset the negative impact of the interest rate cycle.

They are more inclined to see CRCL as a "financial spread product" highly sensitive to macro interest rates rather than a technology company with inherent growth momentum.

The assessment of BTCdayu and qinbafrank is: Interest rates are not the key variable; scale is.

They believe that interest rate cuts are gradual rather than a one-time collapse. Meanwhile, the real breakout period for stablecoins has not yet arrived. Once stablecoin regulations are in place, more traditional financial institutions and corporate users start compliantly using stablecoins, and the issuance scale of USDC may transition from the current level of less than a hundred billion dollars to the $200–$300 billion range in a few years, or even higher.

They are not fixated on fine details like "next year's interest rate is 3% or 2.5%." In their view, as long as the growth rate of issuance scale far exceeds the rate of interest rate decline, the overall revenue scale will still be expanding.

They tend to believe that the current market overly focuses on the "interest rate" as an explicit variable, underestimating the more subtle but powerful force of "compliance driving scale migration."

More importantly, Coinbase's revenue sharing agreement is a "business negotiation outcome," not eternally immutable. As CRCL's market position shifts from "seeking distribution" to "being relied upon," the balance of power will naturally tilt.

Three, Stablecoin War: Will CRCL Be Overwhelmed by Giants?

Jiang Zhuo'er's assessment of the competitive landscape is somewhat pessimistic.

He believes that once traditional financial giants like JPMorgan fully enter the scene, a company of CRCL's size will struggle to cope with credit endorsements, channel resources, and regulatory influence. More importantly, giants have the complete ability to use subsidies, discounts, and even money transfers to capture market share.

In his view, CRCL does not have the anti-censorship properties of USDT, nor does it have irreplacability. Once stablecoins from traditional institutions begin to roll out, CRCL may be marginalized.

@BTCdayu, on the other hand, emphasizes that the essence of stablecoin competition is a battle for user mindset. USDC has already established an invisible moat through compliance, licensing, partnerships, and long-term accumulation. In the future, most funds may still flow to the safest and most accepted USDC. CRCL's strategic alliances with Coinbase, BlackRock, JPMorgan, and the upcoming U.S. regulated stablecoin bank charter further solidify its market position.

BTCdayu and qinbafrank, however, stress that this is a misjudgment of the logic of stablecoin competition.

They believe that stablecoins are not just financial products but typical "network products." The real moat is not capital strength but user mindset, security consensus, and migration costs.

They point out that JPMorgan is already working on stablecoin-like products, but more for an institution's internal circulation of "deposit tokens," belonging to a closed system, more like an enterprise version of QQ coins rather than USDC in an open network.

In their view, large bank stablecoins serve more of their own business system rather than building a globally open settlement network. What truly competes with USDC is a similarly open, compliant, composable stablecoin system, not the bank's own closed assets.

Four, Is Compliance a Moat or a Hidden Risk?

Jiang Zhuo'er believes that CRCL's profit model is built on the institutional advantage brought by regulatory vacuum. Once the rules change, the advantage could turn into a shackle.

BTCdayu and qinbafrank have completely opposite views.

They believe that the stablecoin path will eventually lead to a stage of "being embraced." The first to achieve compliance will become part of the national-level infrastructure.

In their logic, compliance is a safety mechanism, not a restraint. As the gray area is gradually squeezed, players like USDC, which have already deeply complied, are favored.

Five, Short-Term Trading Perspective: Unlocking, Selling Pressure, and Rhythm

Phyrex_Ni's perspective is more inclined towards the trading aspect.

His core focus is not long-term logic but the short-term supply-demand structure. He particularly notes that CRCL has entered a large-scale unlocking window, with executives, founders, employees, and early investors' lock-up periods gradually expiring.

He does not believe that these shares will necessarily be heavily sold off, but he views this as a typical stage of "sudden supply increase," where the stock price faces additional downward pressure.

His attitude is very clear: the current price is not expensive, but he is unwilling to bear the "time cost + opportunity cost" and would rather wait for uncertainty to dissipate before making a judgment.

Six, Payment Realities Barrier: Structural Restrictions of USDC in the US

Phyrex_Ni raises a rarely discussed but, in his opinion, crucial issue: tax attributes.

He points out that under the US tax system, USDC is not treated as "cash" but as an "asset." This means that every time USDC is used for payment, it may trigger capital gains tax calculation obligations.

This inherent nature of USDC makes it difficult to enter the US retail payment scene. Even if the regulatory path is clear, as long as the tax law remains unchanged, large-scale consumer payments are almost impossible to achieve.

In his view, this will limit USDC's payment ceiling in the US domestic market, making it more likely to stay in B2B, cross-border settlement, and financial backend instead of becoming true "digital cash."

Seven, Long-Term Space: Cyclical Target or Structural Opportunity?

qinbafrank is a typical long-term bull.

His logic is not complicated: stablecoins represent a massively scalable track that is far from reaching its ceiling. Transitioning from the current billions of dollars to tens of trillions in the future is not a fantasy.

He believes that in a market with tenfold potential, leading and pre-leading companies naturally enjoy a premium. Although CRCL is not the absolute first, it is the most compliant and easily accepted by the institutional system.

From his perspective, what the market truly should do is not be fixated on short-term fluctuations, but rather identify which companies qualify to participate in the "last-round centralization dividend" within this structural racetrack.

Summary

The cheaper the price, the more diligently it should be researched, rather than easily dismissed. What the current short position sees is short-term structural risks: high distribution costs, path dependency on interest rates, supply pressure from unlocking, and the potential impact of marginal changes in taxation and regulation. On the other hand, the long position bets on a longer-term structural dividend: the migration of global settlement demand, the institutionalization process of compliant stablecoins, and the "quasi-infrastructure attributes" once network products take shape.

Undeniably, for a long time to come, Circle may find it challenging to beat Tether, but likewise, new competitors will find it extremely difficult to replicate Circle's completed compliance path, channel network, and institutional trust accumulation in a short period.

Original Article Link

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China's Central Bank and Eight Other Departments' Latest Regulatory Focus: Key Attention to RWA Tokenized Asset Risk


Foreword: Today, the People's Bank of China's website published the "Notice of the People's Bank of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration for Market Regulation, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Preventing and Dealing with Risks Related to Virtual Currency and Others (Yinfa [2026] No. 42)", the latest regulatory requirements from the eight departments including the central bank, which are basically consistent with the regulatory requirements of recent years. The main focus of the regulation is on speculative activities such as virtual currency trading, exchanges, ICOs, overseas platform services, and this time, regulatory oversight of RWA has been added, explicitly prohibiting RWA tokenization, stablecoins (especially those pegged to the RMB). The following is the full text:


To the people's governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:


  Recently, there have been speculative activities related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets (RWA) tokenization, disrupting the economic and financial order and jeopardizing the property security of the people. In order to further prevent and address the risks related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets tokenization, effectively safeguard national security and social stability, in accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks," "Securities Law of the People's Republic of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Futures and Derivatives," "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Renminbi," "Regulations on Prevention and Disposal of Illegal Fundraising," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration," "Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China," and other provisions, after reaching consensus with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and with the approval of the State Council, the relevant matters are notified as follows:


  I. Clarify the essential attributes of virtual currency, Real-World Assets tokenization, and related business activities


  (I) Virtual currency does not possess the legal status equivalent to fiat currency. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Ether, Tether, etc., have the main characteristics of being issued by non-monetary authorities, using encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technology, existing in digital form, etc. They do not have legal tender status, should not and cannot be circulated and used as currency in the market.


  The business activities related to virtual currency are classified as illegal financial activities. The exchange of fiat currency and virtual currency within the territory, exchange of virtual currencies, acting as a central counterparty in buying and selling virtual currencies, providing information intermediary and pricing services for virtual currency transactions, token issuance financing, and trading of virtual currency-related financial products, etc., fall under illegal financial activities, such as suspected illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public issuance of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, etc., are strictly prohibited across the board and resolutely banned in accordance with the law. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to provide virtual currency-related services to domestic entities in any form.


  A stablecoin pegged to a fiat currency indirectly fulfills some functions of the fiat currency in circulation. Without the consent of relevant authorities in accordance with the law and regulations, any domestic or foreign entity or individual is not allowed to issue a RMB-pegged stablecoin overseas.


(II)Tokenization of Real-World Assets refers to the use of encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technologies to transform ownership rights, income rights, etc., of assets into tokens (tokens) or other interests or bond certificates with token (token) characteristics, and carry out issuance and trading activities.


  Engaging in the tokenization of real-world assets domestically, as well as providing related intermediary, information technology services, etc., which are suspected of illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public offering of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, and other illegal financial activities, shall be prohibited; except for relevant business activities carried out with the approval of the competent authorities in accordance with the law and regulations and relying on specific financial infrastructures. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to illegally provide services related to the tokenization of real-world assets to domestic entities in any form.


  II. Sound Work Mechanism


  (III) Inter-agency Coordination. The People's Bank of China, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of virtual currency-related illegal financial activities.


  The China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of illegal financial activities related to the tokenization of real-world assets.


  (IV) Strengthening Local Implementation. The people's governments at the provincial level are overall responsible for the prevention and disposal of risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets in their respective administrative regions. The specific leading department is the local financial regulatory department, with participation from branches and dispatched institutions of the State Council's financial regulatory department, telecommunications regulators, public security, market supervision, and other departments, in coordination with cyberspace departments, courts, and procuratorates, to improve the normalization of the work mechanism, effectively connect with the relevant work mechanisms of central departments, form a cooperative and coordinated working pattern between central and local governments, effectively prevent and properly handle risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets, and maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  III. Strengthened Risk Monitoring, Prevention, and Disposal


  (5) Enhanced Risk Monitoring. The People's Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Cyberspace Administration of China, and other departments continue to improve monitoring techniques and system support, enhance cross-departmental data analysis and sharing, establish sound information sharing and cross-validation mechanisms, promptly grasp the risk situation of activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization. Local governments at all levels give full play to the role of local monitoring and early warning mechanisms. Local financial regulatory authorities, together with branches and agencies of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, as well as departments of cyberspace and public security, ensure effective connection between online monitoring, offline investigation, and fund tracking, efficiently and accurately identify activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly share risk information, improve early warning information dissemination, verification, and rapid response mechanisms.


  (6) Strengthened Oversight of Financial Institutions, Intermediaries, and Technology Service Providers. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing account opening, fund transfer, and clearing services for virtual currency-related business activities, issuing and selling financial products related to virtual currency, including virtual currency and related financial products in the scope of collateral, conducting insurance business related to virtual currency, or including virtual currency in the scope of insurance liability. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing custody, clearing, and settlement services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related business and related financial products. Relevant intermediary institutions and information technology service providers are prohibited from providing intermediary, technical, or other services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related businesses and related financial products.


  (7) Enhanced Management of Internet Information Content and Access. Internet enterprises are prohibited from providing online business venues, commercial displays, marketing, advertising, or paid traffic diversion services for virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities. Upon discovering clues of illegal activities, they should promptly report to relevant departments and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and inquiries. Based on the clues transferred by the financial regulatory authorities, the cyberspace administration, telecommunications authorities, and public security departments should promptly close and deal with websites, mobile applications (including mini-programs), and public accounts engaged in virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities in accordance with the law.


  (8) Strengthened Entity Registration and Advertisement Management. Market supervision departments strengthen entity registration and management, and enterprise and individual business registrations must not contain terms such as "virtual currency," "virtual asset," "cryptocurrency," "crypto asset," "stablecoin," "real-world asset tokenization," or "RWA" in their names or business scopes. Market supervision departments, together with financial regulatory authorities, legally enhance the supervision of advertisements related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly investigating and handling relevant illegal advertisements.


  (IX) Continued Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities. The National Development and Reform Commission, together with relevant departments, strictly controls virtual currency mining activities, continuously promotes the rectification of virtual currency mining activities. The people's governments of various provinces take overall responsibility for the rectification of "mining" within their respective administrative regions. In accordance with the requirements of the National Development and Reform Commission and other departments in the "Notice on the Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities" (NDRC Energy-saving Building [2021] No. 1283) and the provisions of the "Guidance Catalog for Industrial Structure Adjustment (2024 Edition)," a comprehensive review, investigation, and closure of existing virtual currency mining projects are conducted, new mining projects are strictly prohibited, and mining machine production enterprises are strictly prohibited from providing mining machine sales and other services within the country.


  (X) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal Financial Activities. Upon discovering clues to illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets, local financial regulatory authorities, branches of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, and other relevant departments promptly investigate, determine, and properly handle the issues in accordance with the law, and seriously hold the relevant entities and individuals legally responsible. Those suspected of crimes are transferred to the judicial authorities for processing according to the law.


 (XI) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal and Criminal Activities. The Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, as well as judicial and procuratorial organs, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, rigorously crack down on illegal and criminal activities related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, such as fraud, money laundering, illegal business operations, pyramid schemes, illegal fundraising, and other illegal and criminal activities carried out under the guise of virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, etc.


  (XII) Strengthen Industry Self-discipline. Relevant industry associations should enhance membership management and policy advocacy, based on their own responsibilities, advocate and urge member units to resist illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets. Member units that violate regulatory policies and industry self-discipline rules are to be disciplined in accordance with relevant self-regulatory management regulations. By leveraging various industry infrastructure, conduct risk monitoring related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, and promptly transfer issue clues to relevant departments.


  IV. Strict Supervision of Domestic Entities Engaging in Overseas Business Activities


(XIII) Without the approval of relevant departments in accordance with the law and regulations, domestic entities and foreign entities controlled by them may not issue virtual currency overseas.


  (XIV) Domestic entities engaging directly or indirectly in overseas external debt-based tokenization of real-world assets, or conducting asset securitization activities abroad based on domestic ownership rights, income rights, etc. (hereinafter referred to as domestic equity), should be strictly regulated in accordance with the principles of "same business, same risk, same rules." The National Development and Reform Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other relevant departments regulate it according to their respective responsibilities. For other forms of overseas real-world asset tokenization activities based on domestic equity by domestic entities, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with relevant departments, supervise according to their division of responsibilities. Without the consent and filing of relevant departments, no unit or individual may engage in the above-mentioned business.


  (15) Overseas subsidiaries and branches of domestic financial institutions providing Real World Asset Tokenization-related services overseas shall do so legally and prudently. They shall have professional personnel and systems in place to effectively mitigate business risks, strictly implement customer onboarding, suitability management, anti-money laundering requirements, and incorporate them into the domestic financial institutions' compliance and risk management system. Intermediaries and information technology service providers offering Real World Asset Tokenization services abroad based on domestic equity or conducting Real World Asset Tokenization business in the form of overseas debt for domestic entities directly or indirectly venturing abroad must strictly comply with relevant laws and regulations. They should establish and improve relevant compliance and internal control systems in accordance with relevant normative requirements, strengthen business and risk control, and report the business developments to the relevant regulatory authorities for approval or filing.


  V. Strengthen Organizational Implementation


  (16) Strengthen organizational leadership and overall coordination. All departments and regions should attach great importance to the prevention of risks related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization, strengthen organizational leadership, clarify work responsibilities, form a long-term effective working mechanism with centralized coordination, local implementation, and shared responsibilities, maintain high pressure, dynamically monitor risks, effectively prevent and mitigate risks in an orderly and efficient manner, legally protect the property security of the people, and make every effort to maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  (17) Widely carry out publicity and education. All departments, regions, and industry associations should make full use of various media and other communication channels to disseminate information through legal and policy interpretation, analysis of typical cases, and education on investment risks, etc. They should promote the illegality and harm of virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses and their manifestations, fully alert to potential risks and hidden dangers, and enhance public awareness and identification capabilities for risk prevention.


  VI. Legal Responsibility


  (18) Engaging in illegal financial activities related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization in violation of this notice, as well as providing services for virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses, shall be punished in accordance with relevant regulations. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law. For domestic entities and individuals who knowingly or should have known that overseas entities illegally provided virtual currency or Real World Asset Tokenization-related services to domestic entities and still assisted them, relevant responsibilities shall be pursued according to the law. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law.


  (19) If any unit or individual invests in virtual currencies, Real World Asset Tokens, and related financial products against public order and good customs, the relevant civil legal actions shall be invalid, and any resulting losses shall be borne by them. If there are suspicions of disrupting financial order and jeopardizing financial security, the relevant departments shall deal with them according to the law.


  This notice shall enter into force upon the date of its issuance. The People's Bank of China and ten other departments' "Notice on Further Preventing and Dealing with the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation" (Yinfa [2021] No. 237) is hereby repealed.


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